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Abstract
We collect information on prenatal testosterone in a large sample
of entrepreneurs by measuring the length of their 2th to 4th ﬁngers in
face to face interviews. Entrepreneurs with higher exposure to prenatal
testosterone (lower second to fourth digit ratio) manage larger ﬁrms, are
matched with larger ﬁrms when acquire control and experience faster av-
erage growth over the years they manage the ﬁrm. We also ﬁnd that pre-
natal testosterone is correlated with elicited measures of entrepreneurial
skills such as ability to stand work, and the latter are correlated with
ﬁrm size. This evidence suggests entrepreneurial skills have a biological
component and is consistent with models of the size distribution of ﬁrms
based on entrepreneurial ability. However, ﬁrms run by high-testosterone
entrepreneurs have lower proﬁtability as measured by return on assets.
We oﬀer evidence that this is because the same biological factor that
enhances entrepreneurial skills also induces empire building preferences,
which leads high-testosterone entrepreneurs to target a ﬁrm size that ex-
ceeds the proﬁt maximizing value.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L26, L21, L25, D22
Keywords: Firm size distribution, Entrepreneurial success,
Digit ratio
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11 Introduction
Firms in a market economy vary widely in size, proﬁtability, and survival. What
are the factors determining these observed variables, and how they operate,
has been active topic of research in industrial organization and more generally
in economic theory (Sutton, 1997; Luttmer, 2010, survey some of the main
theories and ﬁndings in this area.). It is known that the distribution of the ﬁrms’
size is highly skewed to the right (Quandt, 1966) and follows approximately a
power law (Gabaix, 2009): the number of ﬁrms with n or more employees is
approximately 1/n to some power a little larger than 1. This distribution is
stable, and is very diﬀerent from the prediction of an approximately unique
ﬁrm size that can be derived from u-shaped average cost curves (Viner, 1932,
Hymer et al., 1962). One possible explanation is an underlying stable factor
inducing this distribution. This is the strategy pursued by Lucas (1978) (see
also Prescott & Visscher 1980, and Rosen, 1982). What is this factor?
In Lucas’ model it is a managerial skill or talent each agent in a population is
endowed with, which is drawn from a probability distribution. Given their talent
agents choose the type of employment: become workers, earning equilibrium
wage, or being a manager/entrepreneur, earning proﬁt of the ﬁrm they manage.
A ﬁrm consists of a manager and units of capital and labor employed. The
production function is linearly homogenous. Returns to scale in the control
of the ﬁrm are decreasing, so the eﬀective output of the ﬁrm is a decreasing
function of the total potential output. The skill of the manager/entrepreneur
multiplies this output. A type of ﬁrm is identiﬁed by the skill of the manager.
The equilibrium of this model1 has a simple characterization: agents with
skill larger than threshold become managers, the other workers. At equilibrium,
marginal products of both factors are equal across ﬁrms, and so is capital labor
ratio. By the previous result, ﬁrm size can be measured equivalently by capital
or labor or output, and is increasing in the skill factor. Total proﬁts are larger
at larger ﬁrms but proﬁtability (proﬁts per unit of capital) is the same if ﬁrms
face the same cost of capital.
The theory provides a link between the distribution of the managerial skill
and, for a given technology of production and control, observed variables, such
as proﬁts, size and managerial skill. A test of the theory should presumably be a
test of this link. However, whereas wages, proﬁts, allocation of capital and labor
are all observable, the managerial skill can only be observed indirectly, through
its eﬀects on the type of employment of the agent and, if he is a manager, on
size, proﬁtability and duration of the ﬁrm. Thus, a direct test is impossible,
unless one is willing to conjecture possible measurements, independent of ﬁrm’s
performance of this skill. This is what we plan to do here.
1Equilibrium is an allocation of population to managers and workers, an allocation of
capital and labor to each type of ﬁrm, and wage and rental price of capital which satisﬁes
standard conditions. First, the allocation is feasible (total capital is less or equal to the
amount available, and total labor is less or equal to the total population of workers), and
second, the individual optimality conditions must be satisﬁed: for every level of skill, the
choice of employment is optimal, and for each ﬁrm the capital and lobar used are proﬁt
maximizing.
2There are additional important questions that the theory is forced to leave
unanswered, and that we address. The ﬁrst is what precisely is the mechanism
through which the managerial skill aﬀects the economic life of a ﬁrm? In Lucas’
model, managerial skill is equivalent to a total productivity factor, multiplying
the production function after the decreasing returns due to the constraints of
span of control are taken into account. Other ways in which the skill operates
are possible. Knight (1921) identiﬁed the skill with the ability to deal with
uncertain, as opposed to risky, choices. If we do introduce uncertainty (or
ambiguity), the attitude to risk might be an important factor in explaining an
entrepreneur’s career choice, and his success in the business: an entrepreneur
has, among other qualities, a willingness to take risks. This would make however
a poor explanation: being reckless is hardly a suﬃcient condition for success in
business, since at least the ability to identify proﬁtable opportunities among the
many risky ones is also required. Hence perhaps a combination of willingness to
take risks and good cognitive skills is required. Since these characteristics are
in some measure correlated (Burks et al., 2009), this is a plausible conjecture,
and we provide some evidence below.
So far we have identiﬁed managerial qualities with skills, in a model where
proﬁt maximization is the only criterion managers want to maximize. A diﬀerent
view proposes that the distinguishing feature of a manager is the preferences
he has: these preferences explain both his decision to be a manager in the
ﬁrst place and his subsequent decisions as leader of the ﬁrm. For example
Baumol (1959) suggests that for larger oligopolistic ﬁrms, managers may have
a diﬀerent set of objectives than proﬁt maximization, like maximizing sales (or
total revenue) subject to a proﬁt constraint. Other examples of this literature,
that deals with managers of large ﬁrms, are Schumpeter (1911-1934) and the
idea of managers as empire-builders, Marris (1964) and Baumol (1962), with
the idea that managers may have growth instead of proﬁt maximization and,
along the same line, Williamson (1974). The free cash ﬂow theory (Jensen
(1986)) predicts speciﬁcally that managers may have incentives, and the means
to satisfy them, to cause their ﬁrms to grow beyond their optimal size. As we
noted, this literature analyzes incentives and behavior of corporate managers
and in particular the conﬂict of interest with shareholders, presumably because
for small ﬁrms the constraint of competition is stricter: but the motivations like
desire for power, status and prestige already emphasied by Baumol (1962) and
Williamson (1963) among others, is likely to be present in managers of small
ﬁrms too, as it is in the general population. So the second question we address
is in what measure are the individual characteristics that make a manager, and
predict his choices, skills or preferences? 2
2A third set of important questions is whether managerial ability is a trait that is only
acquired culturally, or has deeper roots, perhaps given at birth, or even genetic ones. This is
a theme that has received less attention in the economic literature (much more in psychology
and neuroeconomics: see for example Zhang et al., (2009), Nicolau et al. (2009)), but it
has of course important policy implications. Our paper bears on this debate by highlighting
the role of a non-cultural factor without however denying the existence and importance of
learned abilities. More generally, cultural factors may interact with genetically acquired abil-
3In our search for an answer we explore the hypothesis that direct mea-
surement of a biological marker can provide evidence of the managerial skill
explanation of the size distribution of ﬁrms. The marker we use is the ratio
between the lengths of the 2nd (index) and 4th (ring) ﬁnger of the manager’s
hand(s) - 2D:4D for brevity. The 2D:4D measure has found extensive applica-
tion in psychology, behavioral endocrinology, personality theory and, recently,
even in economics. To provide a rationale of the eﬀect of a physical measure
that seems so remote from economic variables and appreciate its role, in Section
2 we discuss why it may be relevant. We implement the idea using a sample of
Italian entrepreneurs that, as part of a face-to-face interview in a survey, have
agreed to have their ﬁngers measured and for whom a wealth of other informa-
tion on their traits and characteristics was collected together with survey-based
and administrative data on the ﬁrm they manage.
We ﬁnd that the digit ratio is systematically correlated with the size of the
ﬁrm. Firms managed by entrepreneurs with a lower digit ratio - and thus a
higher exposure to prenatal testosterone - have more employees, higher sales
and higher value, both currently and at time the entrepreneur acquired control.
Furthermore, ﬁrms managed by low digit-ratio entrepreneurs grow 1/2 of a
percentage point a year faster on average over the years the entrepreneur was
in control. Consistent with prenatal testosterone shaping skills, we document
that the digit ratio is correlated with such traits as willingness to stand eﬀort,
cognitive ability and optimism which appear to be valuable in entrepreneurial
occupations (e.g. Judge et al., 2002; Horton, 1992) and which are in turn
correlated with the size of the ﬁrm. This evidence lends support to models of
ﬁrm size based on a distribution of entrepreneurial skills, as in Lucas (1978),
part of which, according to our results, are biologically determined. But we
also ﬁnd that ﬁrms run by high testosterone entrepreneurs make more proﬁts in
levels but attain lower proﬁtability on average as measured either by the return
on assets or by the return on sales. Since prenatal testosterone is also likely
to shape people preferences, a model that allows entrepreneurs to obtain utility
not only from the proﬁts they are able to generate but also from the size of the
ﬁrm they manage as in the managerial models of the ﬁrm, can account for the
pattern of correlations that we ﬁnd in the data.
In sum, our estimates point out that a biological factor of the entrepreneur -
prenatal testosterone - aﬀects ﬁrm outcomes. It does so both because the factor
shapes several skills that are valuable for an entrepreneur and because it seems
to distort preferences away from pure proﬁt maximization. Needless to say,
the idea that entrepreneurs have also non-pecuniary motives besides enjoying
proﬁts is hardly new and has instead a long tradition in economics.3 What we
add to it is that the same biological factor that makes a good entrepreneur may
be responsible for the strength of these motives.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 3 we illustrate a
ities in facilitating or contrasting the allocation of entrepreneurial talents to entrepreneurial
occupations (Guiso and Rustichini, 2010a).
3Besides the cited paper, see also Simon (1961), Gordon (1961), Barnard (1962) and
Williamson (1963).
4simple model of the ﬁrm that allows for the mentioned two channels of inﬂuence
- skills and preferences - and derive some implications. Section 4 describes our
data sources and Section 5 presents preliminary data analysis and diagnostics.
Section 6 discusses the results of the estimates of the eﬀect of the digit ratio on
ﬁrm size, growth and proﬁtability. Section 7 weights this evidence in light of
various channels of inﬂuence, discusses and rejects that our results are driven by
diﬀerential survival probabilities induced by correlation of digit ratio with risk
preferences, and shows that failure of low digit ratio entrepreneurs to maximize
proﬁts does not results in lower survival. Conclusions follow.
2 The digit ratio
There are two key links in the chain linking the digit ratio to behavior. First,
the digit ratio is considered a reliable marker of the exposure to testosterone
in the fetal period, with a lower ratio index associated with a higher level of
androgens. Second, such exposure is considered to have an organizing eﬀect
of the brain during that period, shaping in a permanent way future individual
behavior. There is considerable evidence supporting both hypotheses.
Evidence supporting the hypothesis that high level of androgens before birth
results in lower digit ratio is found in women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia
(CAH), which results in elevated androgen levels at fetal stage, and have lower
digit ratio (Brown et al. 2002; Okten et al. 2002; Ciumas et al. 2009). Ad-
ditional evidence comes from amniocentesis samples, where the ratio of testos-
terone to estradiol has been shown to correlate negatively with subsequent digit
ratio (Lutchmaya et al., 2004).
The idea of the organizing eﬀects on the brain, and so on future behavior,
of exposure to hormones during fetal period was introduced in Phoenix et al.,
(1959), a paper that contributed substantially to the foundation of the ﬁeld
of behavioral neuro-endocrinology. The authors report the result of an exper-
imental study where a group of guinea pigs were born from mothers that had
been injected androgens (Testosterone propionate) during much of the gesta-
tion. The young born had no additional treatment after birth. Genetic females
born after such treatment had the capacity to display feminine sexual behavior
permanently suppressed (feminization); instead, the display of masculine sexual
behavior was signiﬁcantly enhanced (masculinization). Androgens had perma-
nently modiﬁed and organized the developing nervous system during gestation;
also they had done so in their natural direction. The paper originated what be-
came the Organizational/Activational hypothesis of sexual diﬀerentiation, and
more generally it is now widely accepted that perinatal exposure to speciﬁc hor-
mones aﬀects permanently the way in which the adult individual responds to
circulating hormones and hence his behavior.
In light of these facts, the digit ratio can constitute a potentially relevant
index of managerial skill that can be observed and measured independently of
ﬁrm’s performance. In this paper we provide a ﬁrst test of this hypothesis.
52.1 Explanatory power of digit ratio
Even if one is not entirely convinced by the two mechanisms reported so far,
a direct test of the correlation between the digit ratio and individual charac-
teristics may be enough to prove that the digit ratio is a reliable marker of
important stable features of behavior. By its very nature, correlation of a be-
havior with this marker also implies a speciﬁc causal direction. It is known that
the digit ratio is approximately ﬁxed at birth: so whatever this marker signals,
it is something that precedes and is stably determined at the beginning of life.
Education, cognitive skills, even attitude to risks or ability to control a large
group of individuals may be associated with economic success as entrepreneur,
but because they are produced by it, rather than explaining it. Pinning down
the direction of causation is diﬃcult and controversial: no such diﬃculty arises
with the evidence for the link between whatever it is that digit ratio signals and
behavior.
A complete survey of results on the correlation between digit ratio and be-
havior until 2002 is in Manning (2002). Digit ratio is associated with better
performance in competitive sports (Manning and Taylor, 2001 for soccer, Man-
ning 2002 for skiing). Digit ratio aﬀects personality traits and cognitive abilities:
a low digit ratio has been associated with physical aggression in men (not in
women, Bailey and Hurd, 2005). Luxen and Buunk (2005) ﬁnd that a low 2D:4D
is associated with low verbal intelligence, high numerical intelligence, and low
Agreeableness, the Big Five factor that measures positive attitude to others. In
a surprising result, higher scores are found to correlate with higher marks in
Romano, Leoni and Saino (2006). Sluming and Manning (2000) ﬁnd that pro-
fessional musicians (British Symphony Orchestra) have lower digit ratio than
controls.
Turning to the still limited research closer to economics, a low digit ratio
has been found to be associated with high earnings and better ability to remain
in a competitive job in the City of London (Coates, Gurnell, Rustichini, 2009).
Sapienza, Zingales, Maestripieri (2009) ﬁnd a weak eﬀect of low digit ratio
reducing risk aversion (mostly for women).
There are potential alternative measures that might be used as proxies for
managerial skill. For example, a natural candidate is some combination of
personal attitudes, like those to risk and ambiguity, with measures of cognitive
skills. Since we do have in our data information on such characteristics, we will
also be able to compare the relative importance of these factors.
3 Digit ratio and ﬁrm performance
3.1 Hypotheses
In our analysis of ﬁrms’ performance we focus on two main groups of variables:
the ﬁrst describes size (and its growth), the second ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Our
leading hypothesis is that digit ratio aﬀects both signiﬁcantly; we have now
to specify the likely direction of the eﬀect. It is useful to recall in the follow-
6ing discussion that digit ratio is negatively correlated with early exposure to
androgens.
Since the digit ratio has already been shown to correlate negatively and
signiﬁcantly with success in several ﬁelds, including economic success, we con-
jecture that it might be a proxy for the managerial skill in the models of Lucas
(1978) and Rosen (1982). A possible channel of the eﬀect on economic suc-
cess might be a combination of cognitive skills and motivation, characteristics
which are consistent with the general idea of managerial skill. Our prediction
on size is consistent with those models: lower digit ratio should be associated
with larger size. If one extends these models to a dynamic environment, and
links entrepreneurial ability with growth of the size of the ﬁrm, lower digit ratio
should also be associated with higher growth rate of the size, measured by the
number of employees, or value of sales, as asset values.
As for proﬁtability, a ﬁrst working hypothesis is that digit ratio has the same
eﬀect as on size, of negative correlation. But the ratio has also been shown to
aﬀect preferences: for example, it is correlated with assertiveness and aggression,
and is likely to be negatively related to social dominance. So when we consider
proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, we should also consider the trade-oﬀ between higher
proﬁts and the achievement of some other objective that has been the focus of
the literature on managers preferences and their choices; for example, the empire
building motivation or the ”amenity potential” characterization of entrepreneurs
preferences (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). This literature has pointed out that
choices which maximize proﬁt are not necessarily the same that maximize size:
and if managers have a speciﬁc preference for size (or growth) - a proxy for the
amenity potential - then choices might reﬂect this, and favor size even if this
reduces in some measure proﬁtability. If we consider this possibility, then the
prediction on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability may even be reversed: if managerial skills are
in some measure correlated with the strength of preferences for size, then the
eﬀect of our proxy for managerial skill would still be clear for size (because in
this case both preferences and skill move in the same direction); the eﬀect on
proﬁtability could be ambiguous, because now skill and preferences may move in
opposite direction, and the preference for size might determine the ﬁnal eﬀect,
inducing a positive eﬀect from digit ratio to proﬁtability (lower digit ratios,
lower proﬁts).
3.2 A simple model
To cast these intuitions in a formal framework, we present a highly stylized
model which will help the presentation of the predictions we test later. The
model allows for the two potential motivations aﬀecting the choices of the man-
ager - proﬁts and size - appropriately weighted, and derive individually optimal
values. These values will indicate how they depend on the weight describing
the relative importance of the proﬁt motivation in the utility function of the
manager.
Speciﬁcally, in our model we assume that the utility function of the manager
is a linear combination of proﬁt and size, with weights a and 1−a respectively.
7We also keep the assumption, as in the Lucas (1978), that total factor produc-
tivity depends on personal characteristics (skill) of the manager; this is modeled
by the parameter A. Let the production function be y = Akβ where y denotes
output and k the stock of capital (we consider a single factor of production; al-
lowing for labor is trivial). Lucas span of control hypothesis requires 0 <β<1.






















and the value of the ﬁrm
U =( βA)1/(1−β)(ar)−β/(1−β)
The return on assets (ROA) and the return on sales (ROS) are:





ROS ≡ proﬁt over sales = 1 −
β
a
The model predicts that, under the assumption that (1) the factor A de-
creases with the digit ratio; (2) the factor a increases with the digit ratio:
1. Size (measured by k or output y or ﬁrm value U) decreases with the digit
ratio both because the digit ratio aﬀects manager ability A and because
it may induce a preference for size;
2. ROA and ROS increase with the digit ratio but only if the digit ratio
aﬀects manager preferences.4
4Notice that in this simple model in the absence of a preference for size eﬀect (a =1 )
proﬁtability would be independent of entrepreneurial ability. Another possibility is that the
digit ratio aﬀects manager ability to raise cheap capital. This could be captured by letting the
rental cost r of capital depend on the digit ratio. In this case, ROA too would be aﬀected by
manager ability, but not ROS. We discuss this possibility in Section 7.2 and ﬁnd no evidence
in support.
84 Data collection
Our data consist of detailed information on ﬁrms and their top CEO. The data
set is the outcome of a survey conducted by ANIA (the Italian National Associ-
ation of Insurance Companies), covering 2,295 private Italian ﬁrms with up to
250 employees. 5
The survey was conducted between October 2008 and June 2009. Table
1 part A, presents summary statistics on the ﬁrms in the sample. Consistent
with the geographical distribution of business in Italy, a large fraction (44.7 per
cent) was located in the North, 30.5 per cent in the Center and the rest in the
South. The appendix describes the survey design in greater detail and provides
a precise description of the variables used in this study.
4.1 Questionnaires
The survey consisted of two distinct questionnaires. The ﬁrst collected general
information on the ﬁrm, and was ﬁlled by the ﬁrm oﬃcials on a paper form.
The focus of this ﬁrst questionnaire was on the type of ﬁrm-related insurance
contracts that the ﬁrm had or was considering. But the questionnaire also
collected general information on the ﬁrm (such as ownership structure, size and
current performance) and its demographic characteristics.
Insert Table 1, Panel A here
The second questionnaire collected information on the entrepreneur or the
top CEO, and was ﬁlled in face to face CAPI interviews by a professional in-
terviewer of a specialized company. Several broad groups of data were col-
lected. First, information on a number of traits, abilities and preferences such
as the entrepreneur will power, optimism, ability to stand eﬀort, attitudes to
risk and ambiguity of the subject, elicited with hypothetical choices and/or di-
rect questions; second, information on his own personal wealth holdings or those
of his/her family; ﬁnally, information on physical traits, family background and
demographics (see Table 1, B).
Insert Table 1, Panel B here
5Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of entrepreneurial ability on ﬁrm performance is easier in a
sample of small businesses. In small businesses, owned by the entrepreneurs, the link between
the biological marker of the CEO/entrepreneur and the performance of the ﬁrm is more clear.
In large managerial corporations we may even ﬁnd a large eﬀect of CEO exposure to markers
of testosterone on ﬁrm size, but this could be both because high testosterone may casue a
higher ﬁrm size through the eﬀect it may have on CEO ability and preferences, but also
because high-talent managers tend to match with ﬁrms that oﬀer steeper incentives and the
latter can push in the direction of increasing size (Bandiera et. al 2010). If one cannot control
for incentives they would be picked up by the digit ratio.
On the other hand, if exposure to markers of testosterone does indeed results in a larger
ﬁrm size only through its eﬀects on entrepreneurs ability and preference, focusing on small
business implies that any eﬀect we ﬁnd is presumably a lower bound.
94.2 Collection of digit ratio
At the end of the personal interview, the interviewer asked each participant
in the survey whether he or she was willing to have the length of the ﬁngers
measured. They were ﬁrst informed that some recent research has established
a link between choice of employment and success and some physical character-
istics of a person. No mention was made of the direction of this link.6 If the
participant accepted, the four measurements (second and fourth ﬁngers of both
hands) were collected with an electronic caliper, with small measurement error
(0.02 mm). Each interviewer has his own tool; each was given a written protocol
on how to execute the measurement and pre-trained by the company. As part
o ft h ep r o c e d u r et h e ya s k e dt h eC E O st ok e e pt h eh a n da ss t r a i g h ta sp o s s i b l e ;
ﬁngers on the right were measured ﬁrst, and then those on the left. The length
measured was from the middle of the bottom crease at the base of the ﬁnger to
its tip.
In summary, we collected a combination of information on the ﬁrm, and its
most important performance variables, the manager and many personal charac-
teristics: demographics, economic preferences and some physical characteristics,
as well as of his or her family. To the best of our knowledge, this is a unique
data set.
4.3 Balance sheet data
In the data analysis below we also rely on detailed balance sheet information
of a large subset of the ﬁrms that were part of the survey. Data were provided
by the Cerved Group, a business information agency operating in Italy. The
data from the two sources were matched using a uniquely identifying id number.
Data on balance sheets were available for the period 1993 (or later, if the ﬁrm
was founded in a later year) to 2007; we have been able to match 633 ﬁrms for
which the digit ratio measure is available (summary statistics in Table 1, Panel
A).
5 Preliminary data analysis and diagnostics
Out of 2,295 entrepreneurs interviewed 1,346 agreed to have the ﬁngers length
measured.7 Table 2 examines possible explanation of the willingness to partici-
pate in the digit ratio data collection. Participation in the measurement is corre-
lated with some of the observed variables: it is lower among male entrepreneurs
6The measurement of the digit ratio was done at the very end of the interview. Hence
answers to all previous questions were not aﬀected by the measurement, which could have
created spurious correlations if respondents had in mind some desirable pattern of answers.
Since the measurement of the ﬁngers was done by the interviewers, the respondent had no
room to report a ﬁngers length ”consistent” with previous answers. Hence, any correlation
that we ﬁnd between the digit ratio and traits measured in the interviews cannot be the
consequence of respondents answering strategically.
7We disregard 33 observations because either the length of one the digits was missing or
because was a clear mistake. Thus the ﬁnal sample contains 1,313 observations.
10and increasing with age and the height of the interviewed. Education instead
has no predictive power as much as the age of the ﬁrm and the number of years
the entrepreneur has been in control of the company.
Insert Table 2 here
This features may create a potential for selection bias when estimating the
eﬀect of the digit ratio on ﬁrm performance due to non random missing obser-
vations. We account for this by noticing that the main driver of the willingness
of the entrepreneurs to let the interviewer measure his/her ﬁngers is an index of
aﬃnity between the two as reported by the interviewer at the end of the inter-
view (Table 2, second column). Speciﬁcally, we use the answers to the question:
”On a scale between 0 and 10 what do you think is your aﬃnity with the person
interviewed?” that the interviewer had to answer at the end of each interview.
Since aﬃnity reﬂects the answers of the interviewer there is no reason why it
should be correlated with the residual in equations of ﬁrms size and proﬁtabil-
ity. Hence, it can provide an exclusion restriction for the probit regression used
to compute the Mill’s ratio to account for possible selection (Wooldridge, 2002
Chp. 17).8
For the sample of participants in measurement the distribution of the digit
ratio of the right hand (the one typically used in these studies; the distribution
is similar for the left hand) has both mean and median centered around 1 and
is fairly symmetric, but departs from normality because it appears leptokurtic
(Kurtosis= 5.13).
Insert Figure 1 here
Correlation between 2D:4D in right and left hand is high (0.65) and similar
to ﬁgures obtained in comparable studies (e.g. Manning, 2002). Interestingly,
there is considerable sample variation (interquartile range 0.15 and standard
deviation 0.053; see Table 1, Panel C).
Insert Table 1, Panel C here
Table 3 reports regressions of the digit ratio on classical determinants (for the
right and left hand respectively): we ﬁnd that ﬁrst born have a lower digit ratio
which is typical (Manning, 2002); also taller entrepreneurs have a signiﬁcantly
lower digit ratio, a ﬁnding previously reported by Manning, 2002.
Insert Table 3 here
But diﬀerently from all other studies (Manning, 2002), where the digit ratio
is sexually dimorphic, and signiﬁcantly higher in women, we ﬁnd that in our
sample males have a higher ratio; the diﬀerence is relatively small but it is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in almost all speciﬁcation reported in Table 3,
8An alternative is to use as exclusion restrictions some characteristics of the interviewer.
Following this strategy and using interviewer age, gender and height as exclusion restrictions
produces results that are very similar to the ones reported. But these variables have lower
explanatory power than aﬃnity in the probit for participation in ﬁngers measurement.
11including the one in the last column where estimates are adjusted for selection
using a Heckman two step estimator.
In a separate paper (Guiso and Rustichini, 2010a) we argue that what is over-
turning the sign of the gender diﬀerence in the digit ratio in our sample com-
pared to population-representative samples is the existence of gender-speciﬁc
barriers to entrepreneurship. If women face stronger obstacles to enter into en-
trepreneurial jobs - a feature that is consistent with the much lower presence
of women in managerial positions - only those with above average ability will
self-select into these jobs. If digit ratio is correlated with entrepreneurial skills,
only women with strong testosterone markers (i.e. low digit ratio) will show
up as entrepreneurs, hence the result. Guiso and Rustichini (2010a) support
this interpretation with three types of evidence: ﬁrst, they document a lower
incidence of women in entrepreneurship; in the ANIA sample 34% of the en-
trepreneurs are women (see Table 1, Panel B). Second, using diﬀerences across
regions of Italy in an index of women emancipation, they show that the ratio of
women to men among entrepreneurs is higher in regions with higher values of
the emancipation index.9 Third, they show that the eﬀect of a male dummy on
the digit ratio in regressions similar to those in Table 3 is smaller in regions with
a higher value of the women emancipation index. That is, an interaction be-
tween the male dummy and the women emancipation index has a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the digit ratio. In the region with the highest
value of the women emancipation index it turns out that women entrepreneurs
have a larger digit ratio than men entrepreneurs, consistent with the existence
of culture-driven barriers to entrepreneurship which aﬀect women occupational
choice.
6 Digit ratio and ﬁrms economic performance
6.1 Measurements
We measure ﬁrm size using three indicators that are available in the survey.
First, the ﬁrm reports the current number of employees; second, entrepreneurs
were asked to report current ﬁrm sales and ﬁnally they were also asked to report
the value of the ﬁrm. Since the vast majority of the ﬁrms in the sample are
not listed, ﬁrm value is obtained by asking the entrepreneur how much he/she
could make from selling the ﬁrm in the market. To obtain measures of ﬁrm
growth entrepreneurs were also asked to report the number of employees, value
of sales and value of the ﬁrm (using the above deﬁnition) at the time they
acquired control - that is when they started managing the ﬁrm. This allows us
to test the eﬀect of the digit ratio on the growth of the ﬁrm over the period the
manager was actually running it. In principle these indicators oﬀer equivalent
9The women emancipation index is constructed from answers to questions in the 2005
World Values Survey eliciting individuals’ beliefs about the role of women in society. For
instance, one such question asks how much the respondent agrees with the statement ”men
make better business executive than women”.
12measures of size; in practice some of them are likely to be better proxies. First,
sales are likely to be more subject to transitory shocks to demand and thus
be more volatile than employment as a measure of ﬁrm size. This volatility
acts as a measurement error which may boost standard errors of estimated
coeﬃcients, unless one averages sales over time. Second, ﬁrm value has the
advantage that it reﬂects future proﬁts and size; but it is a subjective assessment
of the entrepreneur rather than a price quoted by potential buyers. As such this
measure too is likely measured with error. Third, both sales and (particularly)
ﬁrm value are very likely to be subject to recall bias when entrepreneurs are
asked to report their value in the year they acquired control. This problem is
obviously more severe for those who acquired control far in the past. Since the
average number of years in control is 15 (Table 1), recall bias may indeed be an
issue. Recall bias is likely to be much less severe for the employment ﬁgures:
arguably, entrepreneurs are more likely to remember how many employees the
ﬁrm had when they started managing it than to remember its value or its sales.
This is consistent with the fact that while almost all entrepreneurs report ﬁrm
current employment and 83% report also employment at acquisition of control,
only 869 (out of 2,265 interviewed) report the value of the ﬁrm and of these
only 724 recall its value at acquisition. Many more report current sales but only
half of them also report sales at acquisition. Because of this, in our regressions
on ﬁrm size and growth we will focus on employment but we will also report
estimates using ﬁrm value and sales.
6.2 Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm size
The ﬁrst measure of size we consider is the natural log of the number of em-
ployees. Results are shown in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 here
In all speciﬁcations we insert industry dummies using a seven industry classi-
ﬁcation and a full set of regional dummies to account for systematic diﬀerences in
average ﬁrm size due to industry composition and geographical or institutional
eﬀects. The ﬁrst column shows a simple regression with only these dummies and
the entrepreneur digit ratio. The latter has a negative and highly signiﬁcant
eﬀect on ﬁrm size, which is consistent with the idea that exposure to markers of
testosterone may enhance entrepreneurial skills. This eﬀect is unchanged when
controlling for gender: though males seem to manage larger ﬁrms, the eﬀect of
the digit ratio persists and, if anything is even larger. The next column adds
controls for other characteristics of the entrepreneur (its height, age, being ﬁrst
born, its education and number of years in control) and the age of the ﬁrm.
Interestingly, the eﬀect of the male dummy vanishes while the negative eﬀect
of the digit ratio, its signiﬁcance and size remain unchanged. A decrease of
one standard deviation of the digit ratio produces a 7.3 per cent increase in the
number of ﬁrm’s employees, or slightly more than two employees for the average
size of 32. It is worth noticing that since the digit ratio is approximately nor-
mally distributed in the sample, it induces a normal distribution in the log of
13employment and thus tends to generate a right-skewed distribution of employ-
ment level which is a distinctive feature of the size distribution of ﬁrms. Finally,
the last two columns report estimates of ﬁrm size adjusting for selection; this
is done adding the Mill’s ratio from a probit regression for the entrepreneur’s
willingness to participate in the measurement of his/her ﬁngers on all controls
that appear in the size equation and in addition the measure of the interviewer
perceived aﬃnity with the entrepreneur. As can be seen, the eﬀect of the digit
ratio is unaﬀected; the Mill’s ratio is statistically insigniﬁcant signalling that
sample selection is unlikely to be an issue. This comprehensive speciﬁcation is
further expanded in the last column to include a measure of the entrepreneur
risk tolerance obtained from answers to a question asking which combination of
risk/return the entrepreneur would choose (see the Appendix for exact wording).
One issue is in fact that the digit ratio may reﬂect entrepreneurs preferences for
risk rather than his/her ability to manage larger quantities of inputs. We will
discuss this and other issues related to risk preferences and ﬁrm size in greater
detail in Section 7. For now it suﬃces to notice that according to our measure,
risk tolerance has no eﬀect on ﬁrm size while controlling for it does not change
the eﬀect of the digit ratio. 10
Table 5 shows results using ﬁrm (log) sales and ﬁrm (log) value as measures
of size. We report the speciﬁcation with all the controls, accounting and not for
selection.
Insert Table 5 here
As expected the number of observations drops, particularly when using the
value of the ﬁrm. In all cases the digit ratio has a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm size and
it is statistically signiﬁcant when ﬁrm value is used; the estimated coeﬃcient is
large but not precisely estimated when sales are used, a reﬂection of the high
volatility of ﬁrm sales. For the value of the ﬁrm, a one standard deviation
decrease in the digit ratio results in an increase in ﬁrm value by 24% - around
55,000 euros at the sample mean value of 227,749 euros. The eﬀect on ﬁrm
sales is smaller at around 4%, similar in magnitude to the economic eﬀect on
employment. In these estimates too there is no evidence of selection bias, as
documented by the lack of signiﬁcance of the Mill’s ratio.
The skills of an entrepreneur may contribute to ﬁrm size in the obvious way,
by aﬀecting the growth rate of the ﬁrm during the manager’s career at the ﬁrm
- a channel we look at in the next section. A correlation may also occur because
individuals with higher ability match from the start of their tenure with larger
ﬁrms. Our data show that both ways are likely. In Table 6 we report regressions
of the initial size of the ﬁrm on digit ratio and several control variables.
Insert Table 6 here
The initial size is measured in number of employees, value of the ﬁrm, and
total sales. The eﬀect of digit ratio is signiﬁcant in all three cases, with p-value
10Inserting dummies for the quartiles of the digit ratio in order to capture non-linear eﬀects
shows that often most of the explanatory power comes from the lowest quartile, though,
depending on the variables also the other quartiles matter.
14< 0.006 for employees and values, and p-value = 0.093 for sales. The eﬀect on
size is between 7 and 11 per cent in standardized variables.
6.3 Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm growth
If entrepreneurial ability contributes causally to increase the size of the ﬁrm we
would expect that the digit ratio has an eﬀect on growth during the period the
entrepreneur is in charge of the management of the ﬁrm. To test this implication
we compute the average annual growth rate of the ﬁrm, over the period control
was in the hands of the manager. As before we focus ﬁrst on employment
growth. Table 7 shows the results; the speciﬁcation is the same as in Table
4 except that we now control for initial (log) size, to take into account any
dependence of growth on size.
Insert Table 7 here
We note that initial size is negatively correlated with subsequent growth
and the eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant (p-value < 0.0005). In the ﬁrst column
when only industry and geographical controls are inserted the digit ratio has
a negative eﬀect on employment growth but the coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant. However, adding entrepreneurs characteristics and controlling for
ﬁrm age raises somewhat the (absolute value of the) estimated coeﬃcient of the
digit ratio which becomes signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The result is invariant
to accounting for selection (last column) and controlling for the entrepreneurs
risk tolerance. Needless to say, measurement error in initial size and thus in the
growth rate tends to exaggerate the standard errors of estimated coeﬃcients.
However the economic eﬀect of the digit ratio on ﬁrm growth is consistent with
its eﬀect on the cross sectional distribution of ﬁrm size. Lowering the digit
ratio by one standard deviation increases average annual employment growth
by 0.59%. Capitalizing this eﬀect over the average number of years in control
results in an estimated eﬀect on ﬁrm size of around 9 per cent which compares
well with the estimated eﬀect of 7.3% in Table 4.
T a b l e8s h o w st h er e s u l t sw h e nu s i n gt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fﬁ r mv a l u ea n ds a l e s
growth respectively as left hand side variables.
Insert Table 8 here
Because many fail to recall initial value and sales the number of observations
drops to around 400. The eﬀect of the digit ratio is negative also in these
speciﬁcation and the size of the point estimate economically relevant. Yet,
though in some cases the coeﬃcient is borderline signiﬁcant, inference is more
problematic when using value and sales growth because of the smaller sample
size and the severity of measurement error in initial size.
6.4 Firm proﬁtability
The model in Section 3.2 predicts that the digit ratio can aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁtability
if it aﬀects people’s preferences leading entrepreneurs to value ﬁrm’s size in itself.
15To check this possibility we use measures of return on capital and return on
sales. As shown in Section 3.2, if the digit ratio aﬀects preferences for size than
both the return on sales and the return on assets should increase with the digit
ratio because a lower digit ratio results in an excessively (from the perspective
of pure proﬁt maximization) large ﬁrm size, and thus a lower proﬁtability. To
obtain measures of proﬁtability we merge the survey data with accounting data
from the CERVED panel. Since ﬁrms have some discretion on what to report
as proﬁt, to minimize its impact we report results using four measures: gross
operating proﬁt (GOP), gross proﬁt before interest (GPBI), gross proﬁt after
interest (GPAI), net proﬁt after interest (GNAI); discretion should less relevant
for the ﬁrst, broader measures than for the latter. We scale these measures with
beginning of period total assets (book value) and current sales, respectively.
In all our estimates we insert industry dummies, regional dummies and year
dummies in order to account for systematic diﬀerences in proﬁtability across
industries, location and over the business cycle. In addition we insert controls
for the entrepreneur characteristics and for the age and size of the ﬁrm. We
account for ﬁrm clustering when computing standard errors. Table 9 shows the
result for the return on assets.
Insert Table 9 here
For all the measures of proﬁts the digit ratio has a positive and highly
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the return on assets (p-values range between
0.001 and 0.02). The result is not aﬀected when accounting for selection as
shown in the last column. A one standard deviation increase in the digit ratio
increases the return on assets by about 0.9 percentage points - around 8% of
the sample mean using GOP as the numerator and by 20% using GPAI. Table
10 reports the estimates using measures of return on sales.
Insert Table 10 here
In this case too the digit ratio has always a positive and precisely estimated
eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Interestingly, the digit ratio is the only characteristic
of the entrepreneur that signiﬁcantly aﬀects all measures of proﬁtability: for
comparison, the coeﬃcient of education (once standardized) is much smaller
and often not signiﬁcant.
In conclusion, we have found statistically signiﬁcant and economically im-
portant eﬀects of digit ratio, after controlling for a large set of variables, on
both size and proﬁtability. The eﬀects go in opposite direction: a lower digit
ratio (higher exposure to testosterone prior to birth) is associated with larger
size and with lower proﬁtability.
7 An exploration of plausible channels
Now that we have established signiﬁcant correlations between the entrepreneur
digit ratio and ﬁrms’ outcomes, we can conjecture and test directly some plausi-
ble channels for these eﬀects in our data set. One interpretation of the opposite
16correlation of the digit ratio with the size and proﬁtability of the ﬁrm is that it
aﬀects both entrepreneurial skills and entrepreneurs preferences for size. How-
ever, another interpretation of the ﬁndings is possible: that the digit ratio has
no eﬀect on skills and only boost people appetite for size: entrepreneurs with
stronger exposure to prenatal testosterone attach a larger weight to size and
thus build ﬁrms that depart more from the proﬁt maximizing size.
To sort out these alternative and quite diﬀerent explanations we follow two
strategies: ﬁrst, we look at the eﬀect of digit ratio on the level of proﬁts when
we partial out its eﬀect on total proﬁts through its eﬀect on size and when
we do not (Section 7.1). Second we rely on direct measures of entrepreneurial
qualities. If the entrepreneur digit ratio aﬀects ﬁrm size because it aﬀects skills
we should ﬁnd that it predicts measured qualities and that the latter are cor-
related with ﬁrm size; on the other hand, if these indicators measure skills and
not preferences, they should be uncorrelated with ﬁrm proﬁtability (Section 7.2
below). We then explore whether alternative channels based on ability to raise
capital (Section 7.3) and on preferences for risk (Section 7.4) may explain the
evidence.
7.1 Eﬀect of digit ratio on proﬁt levels
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We assume that the entrepreneur attaches enough weight to proﬁt to stay
in business, i.e. a − β>0. Let ADR < 0a n daDR > 0 denote the eﬀect of the
digit ratio on ability and preference for proﬁts, respectively. The eﬀect of the
digit ratio on total proﬁts, ΠDR , can be decomposed into the sum of its eﬀect








S i n c e( a ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n3 . 2 )kDR < 0a n daDR > 0 the total eﬀect of
digit ratio on proﬁt level is ambiguous. But if the ability eﬀect ADR is strong
enough that the size eﬀect dominates the preference eﬀect, then the eﬀect of
the digit ratio on total proﬁts should be negative - an implication that can be
tested in a regression of the digit ratio without controlling for the size of the
ﬁrm. 11 On the other hand, if we hold ﬁrm size constant, the eﬀect of the
digit ratio on total proﬁt is rkaDR > 0. Thus, if testosterone at birth aﬀects
entrepreneurs preferences for size, in a regression of the proﬁt level that controls
for ﬁrm assets the eﬀect of the digit ratio should be positive. Put diﬀerently,









The ﬁrst term in brackets is negative and the second positive. Thus, the correlation between
total proﬁts and the digit ratio can be negative only if the ability eﬀect is strong enough.
17a regression of proﬁt level on the digit ratio without controlling for size allows
to test the existence of a (strong) ability eﬀect; if this eﬀect is present the digit
ratio should be negatively correlated with the level of proﬁt. A regression of
proﬁt level on the digit ratio controlling for size allows to test the existence of
a preference eﬀect. If the latter eﬀect is present the coeﬃcient of the digit ratio
w h o u l dﬂ i ps i g nw h e ns i z ei sa d d e da sac o n t r o l .
We test these implications in Table 11 using a broad measures of proﬁts:
gross operating proﬁts; results are similar using other measures.
Insert Table 11 here
When no control for ﬁrm assets is introduced (columns 1 and 3) the digit
ratio is negatively correlated with the proﬁt level; the standard errors of the
estimates are very large because of the inherent volatility of proﬁts but the
point estimate points to a large eﬀect (a one standard deviation decrease in the
digit ratio raises the value of gross operating proﬁts by 40% of its sample mean).
When we add ﬁrm assets as control the eﬀect of the digit ratio on total proﬁts
ﬂips signs (and becomes signiﬁcant) - consistent with testosterone inducing a
preference for size.
7.2 Eﬀort cost, cognitive skills and optimism
We have measures of three qualities that are potentially relevant for manager’s
success: willingness to work, cognitive skills, optimism. Willingness to work
eﬀort is measured by the number of hours the entrepreneur said he was willing
to work before feeling the desire to change activity. An approximate measure
of cognitive skills is the grade obtained at the end of the high school (typically
at age 18, the equivalent of grade 12 in the USA). The measure of optimism
is the answer to a question determining expectation on future good and bad
outcomes (left unspeciﬁed; see data appendix for exact wording). We consider
how these measures are related to digit ratio, and how they correlate with size
and proﬁtability. Results of controlled regressions are shown in Table 12 below.
Insert Table 12 here
The direction of eﬀects concurs in all cases. All three measures are nega-
tively correlated with digit ratio, with signiﬁcance between 5 and 10 per cent
and results do not depend on selection (see estimates that include the Mill’s
ratio). Furthermore, as shown in Table 13 all three measures of ability correlate
positively with size (measured by the log of the number of employees), eﬀort
and optimism at better than 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
Insert Table 13 here
The standardized coeﬃcient of willingness to work is 0.06, (p-value = 0.001),
so an increase of one standard deviation produces a 6 percentage point increase
in the natural log of ﬁrm’s employees, or approximately two employees for the
average size of 32. The standardized coeﬃcient of optimism is similar in size
(0.054, p-value = 0.01), and so the approximate eﬀect is the same. Finally, the
18school grade has a slightly smaller standardized coeﬃcient, with lower signiﬁ-
cance (0.048, p-value = 0.082).
However, no signiﬁcant eﬀect from any of these measures is found on prof-
itability, measured either as returns on assets or on sales. On ROA and ROS
respectively the p-values are 0.11 and 0.69 for willingness to work, 0.19 and 0.79
for cognitive skills, 0.94 and 0.37 for optimism (see Table 14).
Insert Table 14 here
In conclusion, we have determined that plausible potential channels of the
eﬀect from characteristics marked by digit ratio on ﬁrm’s size are given by a few
ability measures. Those same measures do not seem to aﬀect proﬁtability. A
reasonable explanation of this ﬁnding, in line with the model of Section 3, might
be that those measures aﬀect in a non ambiguous way the size of the ﬁrm, but
in an ambiguous way its proﬁtability, because of the opposite eﬀects of proﬁt
motivation and size motivation.
7.3 Ability to raise cheap capital
An alternative explanation for the negative eﬀect of the digit ratio on ﬁrm size
and positive eﬀect on proﬁtability is that digit ratio, besides aﬀecting the above
ability measures also aﬀects size because it aﬀects an entrepreneur ability to
raise cheap capital. If so, high digit ratio entrepreneurs would pay a higher cost
of capital; because of this they would invest less and as a result they would
run smaller ﬁrms with a higher marginal product of capital and thus a higher
return on assets. The positive eﬀect of digit ratio on ROA would reﬂect this
channel not an eﬀect on preference for size. This explanation can be ruled out
two ways. First, if true the digit ratio should only aﬀect ROA but not ROS,
since the latter is independent of the cost of capital (see Section 3). However,
we ﬁnd that digit ratio also aﬀects ROS. Second and more directly in Table 15
we show regressions of digit ratio on a measure of the interest ﬁrms pay on their
loans, a measure of credit rationing and a measure of collateral requirements
when borrowing.
Insert Table 15 here
The digit ratio has no eﬀect on either of these variables, ruling out this
channel of inﬂuence.
7.4 Attitude to risk and selection
A possible alternative way to explain the eﬀect of digit ratio on size of the ﬁrm
is to reduce it to a side eﬀect of the diﬀerences in risk attitudes. According to
this view, entrepreneurs with lower digit ratio are more willing to take risks,
a hypothesis which is consistent with several ﬁndings in the literature (and
explicitly mentioned for instance in Coates, Gurnell, Rustichini 2009). Thus,
those entrepreneurs are more inclined to select on the frontier of projects those
with higher mean returns and higher variance. In the long run, these choices
19produce higher proﬁtability and higher growth but also higher variance and
hence an increase in the probability of failure and exit from business activity.
Since ﬁrms which exit are not in the sample, we would more likely to observe in
the lower digit ratio category those entrepreneurs who have been lucky enough
to survive.
This explanation ﬁnds several diﬃculties. A ﬁrst one is the fact that, as
we have just seen, there is a positive correlation between digit ratio and prof-
itability. So to make the theory ﬁt the data we also need to assume that low
digit ratio entrepreneurs choose projects with higher variance but not higher
returns. This may happen if they are risk lovers, or if they are less able than
the higher ratio ones to select good projects. The ﬁrst assumption is extreme;
the second is in disagreement with existing ﬁndings on the eﬀect of digit ratios.
We have in addition a way to test directly the explanation by considering infor-
mation on experimental risk aversion determined in the questionnaires, as well
as the information we can derive from portfolio choices of the entrepreneurs. A
detailed analysis of the attitude to risk of entrepreneurs is in Guiso and Rus-
tichini (2010b). The conclusions suggest that lower digit ratio is associated in
hypothetical choices among lotteries with higher risk aversion, higher ambiguity
aversion and stronger regret. When we consider the ﬁnancial portfolio of the
individuals in the sample, lower digit ratio are associated with reduced diver-
siﬁcation. In conclusion, we do not ﬁnd reliable evidence that, in the sample
we are considering, a lower digit ratio is associated with stronger willingness to
take risks.
A second and more substantial diﬃculty is the connection between digit
ratio and survival, which we now discuss in detail. Our results suggest that
low digit ratio entrepreneurs make more proﬁts but, because higher exposure
to testosterone induces a preference for size they fail to make even more. This
failure of proﬁt maximization implies that high digit ratio entrepreneurs make
more proﬁt in levels but achieve lower proﬁtability. There is a commonly stated
view dating back to Friedman (1953) that economic theory predicts that traders
who do not maximize proﬁts do not survive. This prediction is based on a
model of selection of behavior, or ability (people who do not maximize proﬁts
have either other objectives or are unable or misinformed) and has been recently
formally re-examined by Blume and Easley (2006). Does this prediction holds
in our data?
To answer this question we look at the cross sectional relation between the
digit ratio and the number of years an entrepreneurs has been managing the
ﬁrm. One realistic characterization of ﬁrm entry is that in every period there
is a roughly constant inﬂow of new ﬁrms and a (roughly) constant outﬂow of
existing ﬁrms. If ﬁrms managed by high testosterone entrepreneurs (low digit
ratio) are less likely to survive because they depart from proﬁt maximization we
should see a higher digit ratio among entrepreneurs that are in the early years of
their tenure with the ﬁrm and have not yet been selected out and a lower digit
ratio among entrepreneurs that been managing the ﬁrm for several years but
have survived long because they are more likely to follow proﬁt maximization.
That is the relation between digit ratio and the number of years in control
20should be upward sloping. Figure 2 plots this relation and as can be seen the
opposite is true: the digit ratio of long-lived entrepreneurs is lower that that of
beginners suggesting that low digit ratio entrepreneurs have better chances of
surviving.
Insert Figure 2 here
Table 16 reports the result of the regressions, where we control for age which
is naturally correlated with the number of years in control. Other controls in
the regression are entrepreneur gender, height and being ﬁrst born, ﬁrm initial
size and ﬁrm and regional dummies. The coeﬃcient on the number of years in
control has a size eﬀect (β coeﬃcient) of 7.9 per cent and p-value = 0.048.
Insert Table 16 here
This result is not consistent with a model where traders with low digit ratio
are more risk takers, have higher variance of returns and hence are more likely
to be selected out. And it is inconsistent with the prediction that traders that
have a preference for size in addition to proﬁts do not survive. Indeed in our
data the opposite is true: low digit ratio entrepreneurs are more long lived.
Interestingly, this is the same ﬁnding as Coates, Gurnell and Rustichini (2009)
who document that ﬁnancial traders with longer seniority as traders have lower
digit ratios than traders with shorter experiences. Reaching the same conclusion
in two very diﬀerent data sets, independent contexts and type of activity is quite
remarkable. As far as we know this is one of the few non-speculative results on
selection.
8 Conclusions
We have shown that a biological marker, the 2D4D ratio, can predict signiﬁ-
cantly, and in sizeable proportion, some important measures of the performance
of a ﬁrm, like size, growth, and proﬁtability. This marker may be considered
as a reliable proxy for at least some important components of the otherwise
unobservable variable called managerial skill or talent.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to the method of the analysis: by expanding the
set of variables our understanding of economic phenomena can only improve,
but in some cases this extension is substantial. Introducing this additional
variable allows us to begin addressing the issue of an independent measurement
of managerial skill. We are not claiming this is an exhaustive description: but
we think we have identiﬁed an important component. Testing theories of size
distribution in ﬁrms can now be done, although, as we mention later, there is a
substantial amount of additional research necessary.
Our second contribution is to the speciﬁc understanding of the eﬀect of
managerial skill on ﬁrms’ size distribution and proﬁtability. In theories like
Lucas (1978), the role of managerial skill is modeled in a very simpliﬁed way,
and it is equivalent to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc scaling of the production function, after
the eﬀects of the span of controls have been taken into account. It could not be
21otherwise, since no speciﬁc information is available in the model on what the
managerial skill is, for example whether it is a cognitive skill or leadership ability.
Neither is it clear how it can be measured independently of the observed eﬀects
on the ﬁrm. The additional information and control variables (personality,
education, economic preferences) allow us to formulate and test more speciﬁc
hypotheses on the way in which these eﬀects operate. In particular we have
tested alternative theories of the role of the entrepreneur/manager. One theory
views his contribution as eﬀectively implementing proﬁt maximization, hence
his eﬀect is primarily on (the scaling of) the production function. The other
theory claims that, within the constraints of a market economy, managers bring
into their decisions their own preferences on ﬁrms’ outcomes, which include size
in addition to proﬁt. We have found that the most plausible explanation of the
data is a combination of the two.
A more challenging research lying ahead is now a more direct test of the
theories of ﬁrms’ size. This test will require appropriate data that were only in
part available to us. An essential element in this research will be gathering a data
set that includes data on entrepreneurs and the general population, to identify
what is speciﬁc to the managers’ population. This data set should include
information on cognitive skills, personality traits, socio-economic variables, and
biological variables like the digit ratio we considered here. Our results show
that this research is promising.
229 Appendix: Information on Data
The ANIA survey
The ANIA Survey for Small Business Companies collects data on a sample
of 2,295 Italian ﬁrms and their top manager. The survey was conducted on
a sample of small Italian ﬁrms, having up to a maximum of 250 employees,
extracted from the total number of companies registered with CERVED - a
business information agency operating in Italy which collects companies balance
sheet data. The survey was conducted between October 2008 and July 2009.
Compared to the initial target set at the completion of 2,300 interviews, the
investigation closed with 2,295 completed interviews. Participation in the survey
entails the willingness to provide information on the use of insurance markets
and details regarding the ﬁrm as well as the willingness of the top CEO/owner
of the company to take part in a face to face interview with a professional
interviewer. The ﬁrst type of data was collected through a questionnaire ﬁlled
out by each company, while the second type was obtained through an interview
using the Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) method. Partly because
the survey took place during the ﬁnancial crisis and partly because interviews
targeted the CEO of the ﬁrm, the drop out rate was relatively high particularly
among ﬁrms in the larger size categories lengthening. To account for this the
survey design was slightly reviewed to include a larger number of smaller ﬁrms
(with less than 20 employees) which were easier targets. This has caused the
sample to be somewhat biased towards smaller ﬁrms than the population of
businesses with up to 250 employees.
In the ﬁnal sample of 2,295 ﬁrms, 98.5% are private, located in 59% of cases
in north Italy, 19% in central Italy and 22% in the south and islands. In 85%
of cases these are controlled by an individual within a family and a remaining
10% by a group of people without family ties.
Variables deﬁnitions
Here we provide a detailed description of the variables used in the paper whose
deﬁnition is not obvious.
Aﬃnity: index obtained from thye answers to the question ”On a scale be-
tween 0 and 10 what do you think is your aﬃnity with the person interviewed?”
that the interviewer had to answer at the end of each interview.
Age of entrepreneur:i ny e a r s .
Collateral requirements: value of collateral as a fraction of the value of the
stock of outstanding loans; reported in the ﬁrms general survey questionnaire.
Answer to the question: With reference to outstanding bank loans can you tell
what is the value of the goods oﬀered as collateral as a fraction of these loans?
Cost of work eﬀort: obtained from the following question to the entrepreneur
23”When you work, after how many hours do you start feeling like stopping and
do something else?”.
Education: Number of years of schooling of the entrepreneur.
Firm age: Years since ﬁrm foundation
First born: Indicator equal to 1 if entrepreneur is the ﬁrst born child.
Grade at secondary school: Grade obtained at the end of secondary school,
when students have to pass an exam and obtain a secondary school diploma.
Grades are on a 0 to 100 scale.
Height: Entrepreneur’s height in centimeters
Interest rate: Interest rate charged to the ﬁrm by the main bank lender on
credit lines.
Initial size: Measured as either the number of employees, the value of the
ﬁrm, in the year the entrepreneur acquired control of the ﬁrm. Initial sales and
ﬁrm value were reported in prices of that year. We have expressed them in 2008
prices using the GDP deﬂator.
Male: Indicator equal to 1 if entrepreneur is a male.
Optimism: answers to the question borrowed from a standard Life Orienta-
tion Test (Scheier et al., 1994) ” How much do you agree with the statement:
overall I expect more good things than bad things to happen to me”. Answers
are on a 0 to 10 scale, and are increasing in optimism.
Risk tolerance: Indicator obtained using the answers to the question ”If
the investment strategy of the ﬁrm depends only on you, among the following
alternative strategies which one would you pick up? One that yields a) Low
proﬁts but no risk of losses; b) Decent proﬁts and rare losses; c) Good proﬁts
with some chances of incurring losses; d) Very high proﬁts with a high risk of
signiﬁcant losses. The indicator is coded between 1 and 4, increasing in risk
tolerance.
Rationing: Indicator equal to 1 if the ﬁrms has been turned down for credit
over the 5 years before the interview. Obtained from the questions: Over the
past 5 years, has the ﬁrm applied to a bank to increase the size of existing loans
or to obtain a new loan? (Answers: yes, no). if so, did it occurred to you that
the application was turned down? (Answers: Yes once, yes more than once,
non never). Rationing is set to 1 if the ﬁrm has been turned down one or more
times.
Return on assets and return on sales: Four measures of accounting proﬁts
are used: Gross operating margin; Gross proﬁt before interest; Gross proﬁts
after interest; Net proﬁts after interest. Each of these measures is scaled with
the book value of total assets to obtain a measure of ROA and with ﬁrm sales
to obtain a measure of ROS
Total assets: Book value of ﬁrm total assets.
Years in control: Number of years since the entrepreneur has acquired the
responsibility of the management of the ﬁrm.
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28Tables and Figures
In all tables below, robust p-values are reported in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant
at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Table 1: Summary statistics for ﬁrms, entrepreneurs and digit ratios.
See the appendix for variables deﬁnitions; ﬁrm value and sales are in millions
of 2008 euros.
variable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Panel A: Firms
Size: employment 31.631 20 40.126
Size: ﬁrm value 239.603 2.50 1648.289
Size: ﬁrm sales 14.378 2.50 49.184
Growth: employment 0.0675 0.035 0.181
Growth: ﬁrm value 0.164 0.073 0.391
Growth: ﬁrm sales 0.14 0.049 0.346
GOP/assets 0.115 0.099 0.119
GPBI/assets 0.060 0.053 0.076
GPAI/ assets 0.042 0.031 0.079
NPAI/ assets 0.014 0.007 0.054
GOP/sales 0.092 0.082 0.112
GPBI/sales 0.042 0.042 0.032
GPAI/ sales 0.028 0.023 0.080
NPAI/ sales 0.006 0.008 0.059
Firm age 25.820 21 23.03
Located North East 0.131 0 0.338
Located North West 0.316 0 0.465
Located Center 0.305 0 0.460
Panel B: Entrepreneurs
Male (share) 0.662 1 0.4737
Age 47.46 47 10.3
Education (years) 13.23 13 2.717
Height (cm) 172.49 172 8.251
First born 0.571 1 0.495
Years in control 15.21 12 11.746
Risk Proﬁle 2.29 2 0.705
Work eﬀort 8.81 9 2.588
Optimism 7.24 7 1.768
Aﬃnity 7.12 8 2.04
Panel C: Digit ratios
Right hand: whole sample 1.001 1,0 0.0522
Right hand: male 1.002 1,0 0.0528
Right hand: female 0.9995 0.9997 0.0509
Left hand: whole sample 0.9998 0.9999 0.0496
Left hand: male 1.002 1,0 0.0494
Left hand: female 0.9977 0.9951 0.0497
29Table 2: Probit regression on participation to digit ratio collection.
Probit of the agreement of the entrepreneurs to have their ﬁngers measured.
Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the variable mean. Aﬃnity is an index between
0 and 10 measuring aﬃnity between the entrepreneur and the interviewer as












First born –0.016 0.018
(0.447) (0.402)
Age of ﬁrm –0.001
(0.128)





30Table 3: Classical determinants of digit ratio. The dependent variable is
the ratio of second to fourth digit of the right hand (Panel A) and left hand
(Panel B).
(1) (2) (3) Selection Adjusted
Panel A: Right Hand
Male 0.003 0.007* 0.007* 0.007
(0.396) (0.070) (0.090) (0.121)
Height –0.000* –0.000* –0.000*
(0.050) (0.066) (0.075)
First born –0.008*** –0.007** –0.007**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.024)
North West –0.005 –0.003
(0.406) (0.669)






r2 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.010
N 1313 1313 1313 1167
Panel B. Left Hand
Male 0.007** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.013) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005)
Height –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.030)
First born –0.008*** –0.009*** –0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
North West 0.003 –0.001
(0.581) (0.942)






r2 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.023
N 1313 1313 1313 1167
31Table 4: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm size: employment. The dependent
variable is log of the number of the ﬁrm employees. β coeﬃcients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.074*** –0.077*** –0.073*** –0.075*** –0.074***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Male 0.081*** 0.026 0.031 0.029
(0.002) (0.466) (0.426) (0.446)
Age 0.007 0.001 0.005
(0.821) (0.970) (0.885)
Education 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.189***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Height 0.040 0.035 0.035
(0.288) (0.386) (0.386)
First born 0.022 0.017 0.015
(0.436) (0.550) (0.601)
Age of ﬁrm 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.198***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years in control –0.013 –0.009 –0.007
(0.717) (0.801) (0.842)




r2 0.096 0.103 0.178 0.176 0.178
N 1313 1313 1186 1167 1167
32Table 5: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm size: value and sales. In columns
1 and 2 the dependent variable is log of current ﬁrm value; in columns 3 and 4
the log of current ﬁrm sales. β coeﬃcients.
Log of Value Log of Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.109** –0.108** –0.024 –0.023
(0.024) (0.028) (0.543) (0.570)
Male 0.100* 0.097* 0.067 0.064
(0.085) (0.096) (0.212) (0.233)
Age 0.054 0.059 0.046 0.049
(0.312) (0.269) (0.274) (0.246)
Education 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.160*** 0.159***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Height –0.065 –0.062 0.047 0.050
(0.266) (0.291) (0.400) (0.381)
First born 0.007 0.004 0.065* 0.064*
(0.877) (0.919) (0.075) (0.079)
Age of ﬁrm 0.096** 0.095** 0.157*** 0.157***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000)
Years in control 0.036 0.035 –0.035 –0.035
(0.497) (0.499) (0.428) (0.431)
Mills ratio 0.176** 0.176** 0.071 0.071
(0.027) (0.028) (0.291) (0.292)
Risk proﬁle 0.036 0.027
(0.434) (0.450)
r2 0.168 0.169 0.171 0.172
N 542 542 753 753
33Table 6: Eﬀect of digit ratio on initial ﬁrm size. The dependent variable is
the log of initial ﬁrm size at the time the entrepreneur acquired control measured
by the log of employment (Employee), log of ﬁrm value (Value) and log of ﬁrm
sales (Sales). β coeﬃcients.
Employee Value Sales
beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.072*** –0.111*** –0.079*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.093)
Male 0.020 –0.014 0.143**
(0.594) (0.816) (0.013)
Age 0.068** 0.076 0.050
(0.036) (0.147) (0.369)
Education 0.187*** 0.143*** 0.131***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
Height –0.001 0.031 –0.047
(0.985) (0.605) (0.394)
First born 0.023 0.049 0.059
(0.417) (0.213) (0.195)
Age of ﬁrm 0.299*** 0.256*** 0.199***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Years in control –0.334*** –0.447*** –0.462***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r2 0.224 0.311 0.299
N 1069 499 446
34Table 7: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm growth: employment. The depen-
dent variable is the annual average growth rate of employment over the years
the entrepreneur was in control of the ﬁrm. β coeﬃcients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.028 –0.026 –0.035* –0.036* –0.035*
(0.128) (0.151) (0.088) (0.076) (0.077)
Male –0.037 –0.057 –0.046 –0.047
(0.281) (0.181) (0.299) (0.290)
Initial Size –0.258*** –0.256*** –0.311*** –0.311*** –0.311***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age –0.010 –0.017 –0.016
(0.818) (0.709) (0.733)
Education 0.033 0.029 0.029
(0.383) (0.384) (0.397)
Height 0.085** 0.074* 0.074*
(0.010) (0.061) (0.060)
First born 0.033 0.030 0.030
(0.286) (0.325) (0.337)
Age of ﬁrm –0.041 –0.037 –0.037
(0.105) (0.127) (0.125)
Years in control –0.217*** –0.213*** –0.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




r2 0.103 0.105 0.151 0.148 0.148
N 1061 1061 1036 1018 1018
35Table 8: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm growth: value and sales. In columns
1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of ﬁrm value
over the years the entrepreneur was in control of the ﬁrm; in columns 4, 5 and
6 it is the average share of growth of ﬁrm sales. β coeﬃcients.
Value Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.086* –0.087 –0.085 –0.061 –0.072 –0.070
(0.081) (0.138) (0.137) (0.228) (0.233) (0.234)
Log of initial value –0.456*** –0.461*** –0.463***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of initial sales –0.418*** –0.413*** –0.413***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.036 0.032 0.030 –0.004 –0.033 –0.043
(0.558) (0.580) (0.611) (0.943) (0.423) (0.319)
Age –0.059 –0.069 –0.061 –0.044 –0.021 –0.009
(0.321) (0.166) (0.251) (0.616) (0.724) (0.863)
Education 0.070 0.077 0.075 0.033 0.050 0.049
(0.124) (0.159) (0.167) (0.471) (0.456) (0.459)
Height –0.006 –0.003 0.003 0.079* 0.121 0.133*
(0.903) (0.963) (0.965) (0.095) (0.104) (0.099)
First born 0.095* 0.095 0.093 0.042 0.054 0.053
(0.081) (0.150) (0.149) (0.566) (0.535) (0.536)
Age of ﬁrm –0.002 –0.003 –0.003 0.014 –0.000 –0.004
(0.955) (0.954) (0.956) (0.712) (0.996) (0.932)
Years in control –0.218*** –0.215*** –0.220*** –0.210*** –0.215*** –0.215***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Mills ratio –0.009 –0.008 –0.148 –0.151
(0.963) (0.967) (0.516) (0.507)
Risk Proﬁle 0.045 0.077
(0.472) (0.209)
r2 0.262 0.262 0.264 0.214 0.222 0.228
N 400 393 393 397 393 393
36Table 9: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm’s proﬁtability: returns on assets.
The left hand side is a measure of return on assets computed using a measure
of proﬁts and scaling by the ﬁrm book value of assets. Proﬁts are measured
using four indicators from broader to narrower: gross operating proﬁts (GOP),
gross proﬁt before interest (GPBI), gross proﬁt after interest (GPAI), net proﬁt
before interest (NPBI). All variables on assets.
GOP GPBI GPAI NPBI GOP
b/p b/p b/p b/p b/p
Digit ratio 0.168** 0.146*** 0.159*** 0.101*** 0.172**
(0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022)
Log of assets –0.014*** –0.003* –0.003 0.002* –0.014***
(0.000) (0.090) (0.113) (0.065) (0.000)
Male 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.014
(0.183) (0.231) (0.135) (0.146) (0.211)
Age –0.000 –0.000* –0.000* –0.000 –0.000
(0.662) (0.060) (0.078) (0.144) (0.748)
Education 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.221) (0.883) (0.957) (0.918) (0.231)
Height –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.000 –0.000
(0.382) (0.163) (0.127) (0.175) (0.414)
First born –0.010 –0.000 –0.000 –0.002 –0.010
(0.190) (0.980) (0.991) (0.465) (0.195)
Age of ﬁrm –0.000 –0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.906) (0.438) (0.675) (0.606) (0.902)
Years in control 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.496) (0.180) (0.524) (0.312) (0.544)
Mills ratio –0.006
(0.785)
r2 0.082 0.044 0.049 0.033 0.082
N 5632 5597 5600 5602 5546
37Table 10: Eﬀect of digit ratio on ﬁrm’s proﬁtability: returns on sales.
The left hand side is a measure of return on assets computed using a measure
of proﬁts and scaling by the ﬁrm book value of sales. Proﬁts are measured
using four indicators from broader to narrower: gross operating proﬁts (GOP),
gross proﬁt before interest (GPBI), gross proﬁt after interest (GPAI), net proﬁt
before interest (NPBI). All variables on assets.
GOP GPBI GPAI NPBI GOP
b/p b/p b/p b/p b/p
Digit ratio 0.157** 0.138*** 0.145*** 0.089*** 0.160**
(0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Log of sales –0.009*** 0.001 0.003* 0.005*** –0.009***
(0.003) (0.603) (0.089) (0.001) (0.003)
Male 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.010
(0.300) (0.549) (0.245) (0.376) (0.306)
Age –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.973) (0.299) (0.307) (0.254) (0.926)
Education 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004***
(0.002) (0.168) (0.523) (0.798) (0.003)
Height –0.000 –0.000 –0.001* –0.000 –0.000
(0.502) (0.307) (0.069) (0.210) (0.423)
First born –0.014* –0.007* –0.005 –0.006* –0.015*
(0.053) (0.099) (0.267) (0.092) (0.051)
Age of ﬁrm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.589) (0.919) (0.288) (0.984) (0.587)
Years in control 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.233) (0.123) (0.296) (0.288) (0.242)
Mills ratio 0.008
(0.709)
r2 0.062 0.040 0.043 0.038 0.062
N 5590 5554 5557 5553 5503
38Table 11: Eﬀect of Digit ratio on ﬁrm’s Gross Operating Proﬁts.T h e
left hand side is the ﬂow of total proﬁts using gross operating proﬁts (GOP).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/p b/p b/p b/p
Digit ratio –5853.839 2940.664* –5158.694 3204.521*











First born –671.582 –27.151
(0.628) (0.887)
Age of ﬁrm –38.556 –8.856
(0.201) (0.316)
Years in control 36.525 16.630
(0.270) (0.110)
r2 0.021 0.985 0.028 0.986
N 5836 5836 5717 5717
39Table 12: Eﬀect of digit ratio on cost of eﬀort, ability and optimism.
The dependent variables are three measures of entrepreneur quality. In columns
1 and 2 the quality is a measure of low cost of work eﬀort; in columns 3 and 4 the
grade at secondary school diploma; in columns 5 and 6 an index of optimism.
See data appendix for more detailed deﬁnition. β coeﬃcients.
Low Cost HS Grade Optimism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio –0.059* –0.062* –0.082** –0.079** –0.051* –0.046*
(0.073) (0.061) (0.037) (0.044) (0.062) (0.088)
Male 0.196*** 0.231*** –0.228*** –0.230*** –0.037 0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.341) (0.804)
Age 0.054 0.033 0.009 0.009 –0.014 –0.041
(0.152) (0.433) (0.824) (0.843) (0.694) (0.282)
Education –0.013 –0.018 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.048* 0.021
(0.683) (0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.500)
Height 0.041 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.024 –0.029
(0.340) (0.942) (0.858) (0.783) (0.547) (0.499)
First born 0.047 0.037 0.028 0.029 0.004 –0.007
(0.130) (0.236) (0.426) (0.423) (0.887) (0.824)
Age of ﬁrm –0.057** –0.050* –0.012 –0.015 0.008 0.030
(0.048) (0.099) (0.721) (0.673) (0.808) (0.393)
Years in control 0.044 0.054 0.023 0.020 0.053 0.070*
(0.241) (0.149) (0.546) (0.612) (0.168) (0.077)
Mills ratio 0.087 –0.019 0.186***
(0.225) (0.787) (0.001)
r2 0.107 0.102 0.115 0.110 0.040 0.048
N 1002 983 835 822 1167 1148
40Table 13: Eﬀect of Low eﬀort cost, Cognitive Ability and Optimism
on ﬁrm size. Size is measured as log of the number of employees. Cognitive
ability is measured by the high school grade. β coeﬃcients.
Interest rate Rationing Collateral
(1) (2) (3)
beta/p beta/p beta/p






Male 0.044 0.054 0.053*
(0.132) (0.144) (0.063)
Age 0.003 –0.012 –0.011
(0.923) (0.678) (0.658)
Education 0.199*** 0.162*** 0.193***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Height 0.026 0.043 0.030
(0.370) (0.236) (0.303)
First born 0.024 0.037 0.024
(0.262) (0.162) (0.256)
Age of ﬁrm 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.187***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years in control 0.014 –0.009 0.018
(0.622) (0.792) (0.504)
r2 0.176 0.159 0.176
N 1837 1290 1941
41Table 14: Eﬀect of measures of ability on proﬁtability. Panel A: The
dependent variable is a index of return on assets measured as Gross Operating
Proﬁts scaled by the ﬁrm book value of assets. Panel B: as Panel A, but Gross
Operating Proﬁts are scaled by the ﬁrm book value of sales.
(1) (2) (3)
ROA Low Cost Eﬀort ROA HSGrade ROA Optimism
Panel A: Returns on Assets
Low cost of eﬀort –0.002*
(0.069)




Log of assets –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
(0.225) (0.321) (0.235)
Male 0.015* 0.017* 0.013*
(0.067) (0.057) (0.067)
Age –0.000 –0.000 –0.000*
(0.283) (0.139) (0.084)
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.803) (0.854) (0.981)
Height –0.001 –0.001 –0.001*
(0.103) (0.155) (0.077)
First born 0.000 0.003 0.000
(0.982) (0.554) (0.962)
Age of ﬁrm 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.597) (0.851) (0.763)
Years in control –0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.967) (0.830) (0.650)
r2 0.046 0.061 0.040
N 5143 3780 5481
Panel B: Returns on Sales
Low cost of eﬀort –0.000
(0.593)




Log of sales 0.004** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.034) (0.048) (0.043)
Male 0.012 0.011 0.012
(0.150) (0.195) (0.123)
Age –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.305) (0.161) (0.154)
Education 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.538) (0.412) (0.768)
Height –0.001** –0.001* –0.001**
(0.033) (0.071) (0.028)
First born –0.004 0.001 –0.005
(0.423) (0.900) (0.296)
Age of ﬁrm 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.241) (0.800) (0.230)
Years in control 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.805) (0.549) (0.541)
r2 0.039 0.051 0.039
N 5101 3739 5430
42Table 15: Digit ratio and ability to raise cheap capital. In column 1 the
dependent variable is the interest rate ﬁrms are charged on their credit lines; in
column 2 it is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm applied for a loan and was turned
down over the 5 years prior the interview; in column 3 it is the value of collateral
as a fraction of the value of the stock of outstanding loans. β coeﬃcients.
Interest rate Rationing Collateral
(1) (2) (3)
beta/p beta/p beta/p
Digit ratio, right hand 0.050 –0.000 0.008
(0.273) (0.999) (0.858)
Male 0.010 0.009 0.016
(0.862) (0.895) (0.770)
Age –0.041 0.043 –0.097*
(0.441) (0.428) (0.062)
Education 0.035 0.046 0.014
(0.422) (0.345) (0.745)
Height –0.152** –0.022 –0.057
(0.010) (0.743) (0.311)
First born –0.032 0.056 –0.103**
(0.466) (0.284) (0.018)
Age of ﬁrm –0.069 –0.027 –0.023
(0.144) (0.610) (0.648)
Years in control –0.024 –0.110** 0.032
(0.682) (0.037) (0.577)
r2 0.179 0.075 0.112
N 489 455 540
Table 16: Digit ratio and Years of control. Dependent variable is the Digit
ratio, right hand. β coeﬃcients.
(1)
beta/p
Years in control –0.079**
(0.048)






First born entrepreneur –0.043
(0.176)
Height of entrepreneur –0.090**
(0.033)
Initial Size of Firm –0.065*
(0.052)
N 1029
43Figure 1: Density of digit ratio, right hand for all, male and female subjects.
44Figure 2: Digit ratio, right hand, and Years in control.
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